Game and Simulation Analysis of the Governance Entity of Fake Housing with the Application of Blockchain Technology
Liu Guihai, Cui Fulong, Mei Guoping, Xu Bin, Liu Zhangsheng
2021, 33 (9):
The governance effect of false housing has become a hot topic of social concern, which is related to the construction of social integrity, the healthy development of the industry, the consolidation of government prestige and the protection of public rights and interests. There are many drawbacks in the existing housing management mechanism spontaneously formed by real estate agencies. The rise and application of blockchain technology provides a new choice for the reform of housing management mode. In this paper, the blockchain technology is introduced to build a government led housing source governance model, analyze the possible game strategy choice of the three main bodies:housing source information publisher, receiver and regulator, and carry out a simulation analysis. The results show that:(1) In the context of blockchain technology, the strength of the initial willingness of the three parties has a greater role in promoting the formation of the final stable equilibrium state, which helps to shorten the time for brokers to choose law-abiding strategies, and speed up the governance process of fake houses; (2) There is a direct relationship between the policy choice of brokers and the change of factors such as the cost of issuing information, the intensity of punishment, and the income. Among them, the cost of issuing information is the most significant one. If the cost is beyond the actual bearing capacity of the broker, the blockchain supervision will also fail; (3) The lower the supervision cost is, the more obvious the positive incentive effect and the negative supervision effect are, the more likely the government is to continue to make efforts in the supervision; (4) The additional compensation of the government supervision are utterly inadequate to make up for the loss of the house seekers and far less effective than reducing the cost of reporting on the strategic choice of house seekers. In view of the above conclusions, starting from the goal of fake housing management, the coordination mechanism, trust mechanism, supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism based on blockchain technology are constructed. Finally, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions, such as building a management mechanism of fake housing based on blockchain technology, actively guiding house-hunters to actively participate in the management of fake housing, strengthening the strict exercise of regulatory authority and promoting the development of brokerage institution system and culture construction.
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