管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (1): 269-277.

• 会计与财务管理 • 上一篇    

高管权力、内部控制与国企费用归类操纵

傅绍正   

  1. 天津财经大学会计学院, 天津 300222
  • 收稿日期:2017-11-16 发布日期:2021-02-03
  • 作者简介:傅绍正,天津财经大学会计学院讲师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年基金项目(72002147)。

Executive Power, Internal Control and SOEs' Expense Classification Shifting

Fu Shaozheng   

  1. School of Business, Tianjin University of Finance & Economics, Tianjin 300222
  • Received:2017-11-16 Published:2021-02-03

摘要: 以八项规定实施前后各两年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证考察高管权力对国企费用归类操纵行为的影响,以及内部控制的治理作用。研究发现,费用归类操纵行为主要存在于高管权力较大的国企中,而高质量的内部控制可以在一定程度上有效削弱高管权力与国企费用归类操纵的正相关关系。具体而言,相对于CEO任职年限较短的国企,CEO任职年限较长的国企的费用归类操纵行为更严重;相对于CEO未兼任董事长的国企,CEO兼任董事长的国企的费用归类操纵行为更严重;相对于CEO由外部“空降”的国企,CEO由内部提拔的国企的费用归类操纵行为更严重。进一步使用董事长权力度量高管权力进行稳健性测试,研究结论保持不变。研究表明,高管权力越大,国企费用归类操纵行为越严重,缺乏相应监督和制约的高管权力将加重国企费用归类操纵行为。

关键词: 高管权力, 内部控制, 费用归类操纵, 在职消费, 外部监管

Abstract: Using the data of two years pre-Eight Rules and two years post-Eight Rules, the paper empirically researches whether executive power could influence SOEs' expense classification shifting and the governance effect of internal control. This paper finds that SOEs' expense classification shifting within the firms with bigger executive power is more serious, internal control can reduce the positive relation between executive power and SOEs' expense classification shifting. Classification, SOEs' expense classification shifting within the firms which have longer CEO tenure, CEO also is the chairman and CEO selected from inside is more serious. The robust test does not change the empirical result. The results indicate that executive power can enhance SOEs' expense classification shifting, especially when executive power is free from supervision and constraint.

Key words: executive power, internal control, expense classification shifting, perquisite consumption, external supervision