管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (11): 238-248.

• 平台经济与价值创造 • 上一篇    

谈判势力视角下平台独占交易行为效应研究——兼论中国B2C市场的“二选一”与反垄断规制

李凯, 李相辰   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院, 沈阳 110167
  • 收稿日期:2020-08-08 发布日期:2022-01-12
  • 作者简介:李凯,东北大学工商管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;李相辰,东北大学工商管理学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目(71873026)。

Research on the Effect of Platform Exclusive Transaction Behavior from the Perspective of Negotiation Power——A Discussion about Chinese B2C Market's “One-out-of-Two” Arrangement and Anti-monopoly Regulations

Li Kai, Li Xiangchen   

  1. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110167
  • Received:2020-08-08 Published:2022-01-12

摘要: 近年来,B2C平台为阻止商家多归属而提出的“二选一”行为受到业界广泛关注。从理论层面看,平台“二选一”行为折射出双边市场结构下独占交易行为的效应问题。本文以Hotelling模型为基本框架,从平台与商家谈判博弈的角度出发,引入纳什讨价还价模型,探究平台独占交易行为效应。研究发现:商家相对于平台的议价能力是决定商家和平台达成独占交易的重要因素。当商家的议价能力居中或较弱时,平台要求商家签订独占交易协议的动机较强。从竞争效应角度看,独占交易行为会打破“竞争瓶颈”,抑制市场竞争,削减竞争平台的市场份额以及利润水平。从福利效应角度看,当消费者搜索成本较低时,随着交叉网络外部性参数以及平台价格补贴的递增,独占交易并非总是降低消费者福利以及社会总福利。基于上述分析结论,结合B2C平台独占交易案例,提出了相应反垄断规制建议。

关键词: 双边市场, B2C平台, 独占交易, 谈判势力, 反垄断

Abstract: In recent years, the "one-out-of-two" arrangement proposed by B2C platforms to prevent the multi-ownership of merchants has been widely concerned by the industry. From the theoretical perspective, the "one-out-of-two" arrangement reflects the effect of exclusive trading contracts under the two-sided market structure. Taking the Hotelling Model as the basic framework and starting from the perspective of negotiation game between platforms and merchants, this paper introduces Nash bargaining model to explore the effect of B2C platform monopolistic transaction behavior. It is found that the bargaining power of merchants relative to the platform is an important factor to decide the exclusive transaction between merchants and platforms. When the bargaining power of merchants is in the middle or weak, the platform has a strong incentive to require merchants to sign an exclusive transaction agreement. From the perspective of competition effect, monopolistic trading contract will break the "competition bottleneck", restrain the market competition, and reduce the market share and profit level of the competitive platform. From the perspective of welfare effect, when consumer search cost is low, exclusive transaction does not always reduce consumer welfare and total social welfare with the increase of cross- network externality parameters and platform price subsidy. Based on the above analysis conclusion and the case of B2C platform exclusive trading, the corresponding anti-monopoly regulatory framework is proposed.

Key words: two-sided market, B2C platform, exclusive transaction, negotiation power, anti- monopoly